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ABSTRACT:  
This paper brings together a multi-disciplinary perspective from systems engineering, ethics,           
and law to articulate a common language in which to reason about the multi-faceted problem               
of assuring the safety of autonomous systems. The paper’s focus is on the “gaps” that arise                
across the development process: the semantic gap, where normal conditions for a complete             
specification of intended functionality are not present; the responsibility gap, where normal            
conditions for holding human actors morally responsible for harm are not present; and the              
liability gap, where normal conditions for securing compensation to victims of harm are not              
present. By categorising these “gaps” we can expose with greater precision key sources of              
uncertainty and risk with autonomous systems. This can inform the development of more             
detailed models of safety assurance and contribute to more effective risk control. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Autonomous systems disrupt established practices of system design, moral responsibility,          
legal liability, and safety assurance. By “autonomous system,” we mean a system that             
makes decisions independently of human control. Autonomous decision-making capability         
can be understood as a spectrum. At the upper end of this spectrum, there are highly                
autonomous systems to which we delegate both the decisional process and the            
implementation of the subsequent action. At the lower end, there are advisory systems to              
which we delegate some or most of the decisional process, but the implementation of the               
recommended action is the responsibility of the human in charge. This paper considers the              
spectrum, but illustrates the ideas by considering both types of autonomous system in case              
studies.  
 
The disruption that autonomous systems present can be explained in terms of ‘gaps’ that              
arise across the design and implementation process. We look at three gaps: the semantic              
gap; the responsibility gap; the liability gap.  
 
The ​semantic gap arises because the normal conditions are not met for manufacturers,             
particularly designers, to provide a complete specification of the system. The semantic gap             
represents the difference between the implicit intentions on the system’s functionality and            
the explicit, concrete specification that is used to build the system. It is a risk in the design                  
phase, but it is also an ongoing problem, with amendments to specification being required              
after implementation and deployment. 
 
The ​responsibility gap arises because the normal conditions are not met for manufacturers,             
operators or users truly to deserve moral blame for the autonomous system’s decisions,             
such as those that result in an accident or injury. The responsibility gap represents the               
difference between a human actor being involved in the causation of an outcome and having               
the sort of robust control that establishes moral accountability for the outcome.  
 
The ​liability gap arises because the normal conditions are not met for manufacturers,             
operators, or users to be liable to pay compensation to those injured by an autonomous               
system. It is the risk that due to the complexity of the system, and its autonomous                
decision-making capability, that when it causes harm to others the losses caused by the              
harm will be sustained by the injured victims themselves and not by the manufacturers,              
operators or users of the system, as appropriate.  
 
The gaps share the same three root causes: the complexity and unpredictability of the              
system’s operational domain; the complexity and unpredictability of the system itself; and the             
increasing transfer of decision-making function from human actors to the system. These            
three issues also affect the safety assurance of autonomous systems. Not only is it much               
more complicated to provide a justification of the acceptable safety of autonomous systems,             
it is hard even to know what the required degree of confidence is within this new paradigm.                 
The central, unifying argument of this paper is that measures to address each of the gaps                
above can inform the safety assurance of autonomous systems. 
 
 
 
We ask the reader to note some clarifications. First, we place particular emphasis on              
autonomous systems that use machine-learning models rather than rule-based models.          
Second, for brevity, we refer to three kinds of human actor: the manufacturer, the operator,               
and the user. The term “manufacturer” should be understood as having a wide scope,              
including designers, developers, programmers, engineers, manufacturing companies. Third,        
this paper is primarily concerned with accident and injury as a result of an autonomous               
system’s decision. Physical harm to humans is not the only risk incurred by autonomous              
systems, but it is an important one, and it is at the root of safety assurance, moral                 
responsibility, and civil liability concerns.  
  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we define and analyse the semantic gap,                
and its implications for safety assurance. In Section 3, we illustrate the semantic gap with               
two case studies: a highly automated driving system and a clinical advisory system. In              
Section 4, we consider the responsibility gap. We propose a methodology - the method of               
reflective equilibrium - for narrowing the responsibility gap during the design phase. In             
section 5, we consider the liability gap. We propose a solution - “tech neutrality” - for                
narrowing the liability gap; it also ensures that the law does not generate perverse incentives               
in technology adoption decisions. In Section 6, we build on this multi-disciplinary analysis to              
propose an approach to the safety assurance of autonomous systems.  
2. THE SEMANTIC GAP 
The Semantic gap is the gap between intended functionality and specified functionality –             
when implicit and ambiguous intentions on the system are more diverse than the system’s              
explicit and concrete specification [11]. There are three sources of the Semantic gap. We              
refer to these as the three root causes throughout the paper. 
 
The first root cause is the ​complexity and unpredictability of the operational domain​.             
Autonomous systems typically operate within an environment that cannot be fully specified            
at design time. This is due to inherent environmental complexity at any given point in time,                
as well as continual, ongoing changes to the domain. Together these constitute an “open              
context,” for which a complete specification is very difficult, if not impossible, to formalise.  
 
The second root cause is the complexity and unpredictability of the system itself ​.             
Because of the computational techniques used, the system is inherently complex. It will also              
change continually through interactions within the domain. Systems that are expected to            
learn and to anticipate users’ intentions may need to adapt to changes in these intentions               
over time, introducing risks not foreseeable during the design phase. In addition, the system              
has technical limitations, such as its incomplete “understanding” of the environment, which            
restricts its ability to react to certain situations. All of these factors arising from the complexity                
of the system make a complete specification problematic. 
 
The third root cause is the ​increasing transfer of decision function to the system ​,              
whereby the human actor is either replaced completely (case study 1) or relieved of a               
substantial cognitive load (case study 2). This entails that new functions are introduced to              
 
 
the systems, including those that historically required human interpretation, ethical          
judgement and lawful behaviour. New functions are also introduced for manufacturers,           
operators, and users, such as the shift from active control of the system to passive,               
situationally-aware supervision. This further complicates the process of specifying intended          
functionality. 
 
To some extent, the problem of ensuring that the system specification accurately represents             
“intent” is already a general problem in the assurance of complex systems. Various methods              
are typically used to confirm that the system specification meets user needs. These methods              
range from the systematic capture, analysis, and review of requirements to statistically            
representative field-based tests. But this is far more difficult against a backdrop of             
environmental complexity and unpredictability, along with increasing decision-making being         
transferred to the system. Here, safe system performance cannot always be guaranteed.  
3. CASE STUDIES 
3.1 Case Study 1 – Automotive 
 
3.1.1 Description of the System and Current State of Development 
Within the last few years, many manufacturers have begun development of highly automated             
driving. Figure 1 summarises the functional components of a highly automated driving            
system. ​Sensing components may consist of various direct sensor channels such as radar,             
lidar, and video cameras, but may also be extended to include indirect contextual information              
(e.g. from digital maps and vehicle-to-infrastructure systems). ​Understanding components         
interpret the current driving situation from the sensing inputs, processing raw sensory data to              
determine the current situation (i.e. vehicle position and trajectory, as well as the type,              
position and trajectories of other traffic participants). ​Decision components calculate driving           
strategies based on a set of driving goals (e.g. drive from A to B) and an interpretation of the                   
current scene. ​Action components execute the driving strategy via the set of vehicle             
actuators (i.e. brakes, engine, steering column, etc.). 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of a highly automated driving system 
 
Recent advances in machine learning algorithms [30] and the availability of increased            
computing power mean that the systems themselves are more able to solve the             
“Understanding” and “Decision” tasks in unrestricted operational environments. Deep neural          
networks can make sense of unstructured data using efficient computations in real-time [24].             
 
 
By providing enough training data, the models learn to identify and classify objects such as               
vehicles and pedestrians with accuracy rates that can surpass human abilities [69].  
 
At present, two strands of development exist for highly automated driving. The first is SAE               
Level 3: Conditional Driving Automation Systems. These take over control of the vehicle             
whilst driving on highways [60]. Here, the human driver must be available to resume control               
in the case of a system failure or when the boundary of the operational design domain has                 
been reached. These systems are an evolution of current driver assistance systems. There             
is therefore a degree of familiarity with their capabilities and their technical limitations.  
 
The second application of automated driving is SAE Level 4: “High Driving Automation”             
systems for urban automated driving. Here, the system takes over Dynamic Driving Tasks             
(DDT) and Object and Event Detection and Response (OEDR) in highly complex            
environments, and has fall-back functions in case of system malfunction. This is a more              
revolutionary approach to mobility. It may take the form of not just classical passenger cars               
but also new classes of vehicles, such as driverless shuttles or delivery vehicles. These              
vehicles will travel at significantly lower speeds than with SAE Level 3, but their technical               
and safety assurance challenges are far greater.  
 
3.1.2 How the System Illustrates the Semantic gap 
The transition from hands-on (SAE Levels 1-2 [60]) of driver assistance to hands-off (SAE              
Levels 3-5) highly automated driving illustrates the Semantic gap. SAE Level 4 in particular              
shows how the three root causes described in Section 2 contribute to the Semantic gap.  
 
First, urban environments are “crowded”, complex, unpredictable operational domains with a           
high number of traffic participants of diverse capabilities, shapes and sizes, speeds and             
trajectories. It is also anticipated that this environment will change over time, as new modes               
of inner-city transport are introduced, and as human behaviour adapts to the presence of              
highly automated vehicles. It is therefore impossible to create a complete specification of the              
operating environment for urban automated driving. 
 
Second, the systems themselves need to be more complex to manage the driving task in               
urban environments. Heterogeneous sensing channels are required to counteract the          
individual weaknesses of each sensor type (e.g. camera, radar etc.). The inputs of these              
sensors must be consolidated and interpreted to provide a model of the environment that              
can be used to implement an optimal driving strategy. The algorithms too must become              
more complex to enable the system to interpret the environment, to predict the intentions of               
traffic participants, and to make optimal decisions as to which action is required to minimise               
the overall risk to the vehicle occupants, other road users and the environment. 
 
Machine learning techniques such as Deep Learning (enabling the system to “make sense”             
out of the unstructured data that results from the complex and unpredictable environment)             
and Reinforcement Learning (enabling the system continually to optimise a function based            
on stimuli collected in the field) might appear to present a convenient technical solution to               
the semantic gap. They seem particularly well-suited to learning functionality that cannot be             
easily specified using traditional procedural means (if X happens, then do Y). But there is a                
 
 
catch. Machine learning functions do not deliver clear-cut answers. For example, for a given              
video frame, they might classify the probability of a pedestrian inhabiting a certain portion of               
the picture as 83%, but in the very next frame -- which for humans is imperceptibly different                 
to the last -- they may “misclassify” the same object as only 26% probability of being a                 
human and 67% probability of being a road sign. In addition, the processes which lead to                
these decisions are difficult to decipher. These attributes result in a paradox or “no free               
lunch” effect, where the problem of deriving a suitable specification of the intended behavior              
is instead transferred to the problem of demonstrating that the implemented (learned)            
behaviour meets the intent.  
 
The third root cause that contributes to the semantic gap with SAE Level 4 systems is the                 
significantly increased transfer of decision function. Because of the lack of a “backup driver”              
to take over in critical situations, the concrete specification of the system must inform what               
the system itself should do under all situations, even when a completely safe state may not                
be able to be reached. This is a huge task, involving considerable uncertainty. Due to the                
open context and the complexity of the decision algorithms it may not be possible to even                
predict which decisions the vehicle would take under certain circumstances. 
 
3.1.3 Implications for Safety Assurance 
The dominating challenge facing the safety assurance of highly automated driving systems            
is the derivation and validation of adequate system safety requirements and the            
demonstration that these will be fulfilled in all feasible situations, including those that have              
traditionally been handled by a human driver. This results in a different class of safety               
requirements to those previously considered in the industry [60]. For example, a higher level              
of component reliability is required, because the system cannot be simply deactivated by a              
human driver upon detection of a component hardware fault. At a functional level, an              
approach to demonstrating the correct interpretation of the current driving situation,           
previously made by a human driver, is required so that dangerous driving situations are              
avoided as far as possible. 
 
The conditions for acceptable functional safety for passenger vehicles are set by the             
international functional safety standard for road vehicles ISO 26262 [32]. This standard is             
limited to hazards, i.e. sources of harm, caused by the vehicles’ malfunctioning behaviour.             
This remains necessary to ensure that the hardware is reliable and the implementation of              
systems is fault tolerant. But extensions to the standard to accommodate autonomous            
vehicles, in particular, the “Safety of the Intended Functionality” (SOTIF) approach, are            
currently focused on driver assistance, not highly automated driving systems [33]. As a             
result, additional approaches must be developed.  
 
The ISO 26262 standard requires the development of a safety case: a valid, evidence-based              
justification for a set of claims about the safety of a system for a given function over its                  
operational context [31]. In the context of the systems in this case study, this safety case                
should provide a structured argument, based on “first principles,” that the driving function is              
safe for all conditions that meet the assumptions on the target domain. It must justify the                
 
 
acceptable level of residual risk associated with this function. This justification will be partly              
1
based on the capability of the system architecture itself to minimise the risk given the               
complexity and unpredictability of the domain, sensing errors, and component insufficiencies           
[16]. The first fatal accidents caused by vehicles operating in this driving mode have              
highlighted the need to discuss and reach consensus on acceptable residual risk for such              
systems [52] [53]. This wider discussion should also include the potential of the systems to               
significantly increase road safety [2][20].  
 
3.1.4 Suggestions for Reducing the Semantic gap 
A number of approaches are currently being considered to close the semantic gap during the               
design of highly automated cars. These approaches target the gap’s three root causes.  
 
The complexity of the operating environment is reduced by limiting functionality to            
well-defined scenarios for which a clear understanding of the safety risks and system             
capabilities already exist. In the case of SAE Level 3 systems, this involves certain stretches               
of highway under limited weather conditions and functional constraints such as no            
overtaking. For SAE Level 4 systems, operation is restricted to geo-fenced areas of urban              
environments for which highly detailed maps and validation data exists [72]. These            
restrictions come at the expense of a reduction of the intended function.  
 
The complexity of the systems is managed by limiting the deployment of machine learning              
algorithms to well-defined and constrained functionality with restricted safety impact. This           
includes using parallel approaches to sensing and plausibility checks. It is also planned to              
make increased use of infrastructure, such as the transmission of traffic signal status, to              
allow for more robust approaches to environmental sensing. In this way, the burden of              
validating the machine learning components is reduced. But reducing the integrity           
requirements on machine learning components through functional redundancy comes at the           
price of many more system components and overall cost. 
 
In current systems, the delegation of decision function to the systems is also reduced. This               
can take a number of forms, including the requirement for driver supervision in Level 3               
highway automation, the use of a safety driver when testing Level 4 urban automated              
driving, or dropping out into a safe state such as stopping at the side of the road in the case                    
of ambiguous and potentially critical situations. These measures result in restrictions in the             
intended function. 
 
It should be noted that addressing the semantic gap will not happen solely in the design                
phase. It will be an ongoing process, with amendments to specified functionality being made              
after it is understood how the systems operate “in the wild,” and once differences between               
usage in different cultures has been more fully understood, including how attitudes to             
acceptable safety vary between countries, etc. The compromises described above may be            
iteratively relaxed as more validation evidence is generated, technological advancements          
are made, and a stronger and a more dynamic overall safety case is achieved. This overall                
argument for safety must address the avoidance of hazards caused by the automated             
1 The risk that remains once all risk reduction measures have been taken. 
 
 
driving function itself, reactions to the failures of other systems in the vehicle, the prevention               
or mitigation of misuse of the driving system, and the reaction to critical driving situations               
caused by other road users and agents. 
 
As yet, no consensus exists for how to reduce the semantic gap and structure a compelling                
safety case for highly automated driving. Governments and regulators are currently in the             
process of consultation to define the relevant legal frameworks [39]. Much clarification is still              
needed. There is therefore a strong need for a common language for expressing technically              
feasible ethical and legal expectations on such systems. Methods to achieve this are             
proposed in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
3.2 Case Study 2 – Clinical 
 
3.2.1 Description of the System and Current State of Development 
The last few years have also seen the development of autonomous systems in the clinical               
domain. One example is “AI Clinician,” which is an advisory system in the treatment of               
sepsis, based largely on a Reinforcement Learning agent (Figure 2). It is designed to              
operate in the well-defined area of Intensive Care Unit patients fulfilling the Sepsis-3 criteria              
[36]. These are also the most unwell patients, with a 90-day mortality in the region of 20%. It                  
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provides guidance on treatment. Whether or not to implement the system’s recommendation            
is up to the human clinician. The AI Clinician can only make its decisions based on data                 
entered into the Electronic Patient Record (EPR). The system was trained using the             
MIMIC-III dataset and uses a Markov Decision Process (MDP), which is ‘memoryless’ and             
ignores the individual patient’s history. 
 
Sepsis is associated with at least 1 in 20 deaths in England [45] and is a leading cause of                   
mortality worldwide [19] [63]. Best practice for treatment is currently rapid administration of             
antibiotics to treat the infection, intravenous fluids to correct hypotension (low blood            
pressure), and vasopressor medications if the patient’s blood pressure remains low [40] [26].             
As both fluids and vasopressor medications can be used to improve blood pressure, there              
remains debate over the importance of each [62]. “Traditional” strategies favour fluids but             
there is some evidence that large volume fluid use can increase mortality. But vasopressors              
are powerful medications that, in the UK at least, require the patient to occupy a               
high-resource ICU (Intensive Care Unit) or HDU (High Dependency Unit) bed. As patients             
are on ICU, fluids and vasopressors are both easily available.  
 
The AI Clinician aims to guide the use of fluids and vasopressors in septic patients and does                 
not provide guidance on any other aspect of care; this narrow focus is probably of benefit.  
 
2 ​The definition of sepsis is hard to pin down, and the Sepsis-3 definition represents a narrower                 
definition than previous ones which threatened to label almost all hospital patients as “septic”. In               
hospital, the word is generally used in a more narrow sense than in the literature, but patients on ICU                   
fulfilling the Sepsis-3 criteria will almost always be considered “septic” by doctors. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Data flow of the AI Clinician [36]  
 
The AI Clinician uses 48 variables to assign the patient to one of 750 states, and operates                 
over a 4-hour window. It is therefore able to be much more responsive to more subtle                
changes in the patient’s status than is possible for a human clinician and bedside nurse. Its                
recommendations are based on a 5-point scale for each of fluid and vasopressor             
prescription, with one zero point and 4 quartiles of dosing. The exact point chosen within a                
quartile would presumably be up to the bedside nurse with advice from human clinicians. In               
general, it appears that the advisory system-generated policy recommends more          
vasopressor use, and less fluid use, than the patients actually received. 
 
3.2.2 How the System Illustrates the Semantic gap 
As with the previous case study, the three root causes of the semantic gap described in                
Section 2 relate to this clinical advisory system. 
 
First, the operational clinical domain for this system is highly complex, including sepsis itself,              
the presence of factors such as new treatments, new diagnoses, new bacteria and viruses,              
as well as differentials in patient care at earlier time points. There is also considerable               
debate within the medical community as to what constitutes best practice in the treatment of               
sepsis, variation of practice between individual clinicians, and a gap between clinician advice             
and what actually happens to the patient, given that the bedside nurse has some authority               
and is in direct control of the fluids and vasopressors. This complexity of the domain makes                
it very difficult to formalise intended functionality into specific requirements. 
 
Second, there is the complexity of the AI Clinician system itself. As with the system in the                 
first case study, there are the technical limitations of the system (e.g. reward hacking in               
reinforcement learning [1]). The AI Clinician can only make its decisions based on data              
entered into the Electronic Patient Record (EPR). By contrast, human clinicians can respond             
to a variety of inputs when making their decisions. The system also uses a MDP, which only                 
looks at the present state of the patient, and thus is quite unlike human decision-making. In                
addition, there is a great deal of inertia the clinical decision-making process. It is highly likely                
that the patient’s fluid/vasopressor state will vary little across time, and this may be a positive                
thing. An autonomous system would not have the same inertia unless learned, which is not               
 
 
possible with the methods used, or specifically programmed in. The implicit, intended            
functionality remains broader than what is possible to specify explicitly as functionality. 
 
Third, there is the transfer of the decision function. Though this is an advisory system and                
the final decision is made by the human in charge, busy clinicians may come to over-rely on                 
the system and not question its recommendations. A human must develop their own opinion              
on the correct course of action, rendering the system less useful, or blindly accept its               
recommendations, making it no longer advisory. It is also still difficult to ensure the process               
leading up to the system’s recommendation mirrors what an ideal human would do. This is               
hard for two reasons. Because human clinicians are not MDP decision-makers, and because             
a clinician or nurse will be able to explain their general decision making process, there is a                 
risk of a lot of this being “post hoc” rationalisation rather than a genuine opening of the                 
human black box. While the developers of AI Clinician have been able to show that the                
factors important to the system were similar to factors expert clinicians would consider             
important, the transfer of decision function does affect the feasibility of providing a complete              
specification of intended functionality. 
 
3.2.3 Implications for Safety 
The ideal method of testing AI Clinician would be “On Policy Evaluation.” This involves              
actually following the system’s recommendations and monitoring patient outcomes         
accordingly. These outcomes should be compared against a control arm of standard            
treatment. But this method is logistically and ethically challenging, and may not even be              
possible given that doctors and nurses may lose equipoise when the system recommends             
an action they consider unwise.  
 
Therefore, testing of the AI Clinician to date has relied on “Off Policy Evaluation,” where an                
attempt is made to judge the ​expected value of the system’s recommendations against the              
actual decisions made and acted on by the clinical team. In order to do this, the study                 
authors have tried to formalise the human clinician decision-making process as a MDP. This              
means treating each clinician decision as a choice based solely on the present state of the                
patient (i.e. ignoring patient history and any non-EPR data), with the assumption that any              
such patient is equivalent, and the actions taken by clinicians would be spread randomly              
(weighted) across the real actions taken by clinicians for each such patient. This             
formalisation of the human clinician decision-making allows it to be compared against the             
system. But ultimately, clinical decision-making is more complex than this and the            
formalisation carries the risk of mis-characterising the human decision-making process.          
Indeed, it is in trying to encode and specify the intention (treat and cure patient) as the taking                  
of actions that have a predicted high probability of moving towards higher-scoring positions             
in state space, that the semantic gap emerges. The intended functionality requires            
something more diverse than this specification. 
 
Fundamentally this remains a difficult problem for the safety assurance of AI Clinician – how               
to test the system’s advice without following it, given that following it might be dangerous,               
resulting in serious physical harm to patients.  
 
3.2.4 Suggestions for Reducing the Semantic Gap 
 
 
As with the automotive case study, approaches that narrow the semantic gap with this              
clinical advisory system target the gap’s three root causes.  
 
The complexity of the operational domain is reduced by ignoring aspects of the decisional              
process, such as limiting the number of informational inputs compared to those received by              
human clinicians. But this may result in unintended consequences (e.g. ‘insensible losses’            
of fluid cannot be electronically recorded, which may lead to a system suggesting more fluids               
when a clinician could tell that the patient is already ‘waterlogged’). Clinical decision making              
integrates history, physical examination, and recorded numbers, but only the last of these is              
available to the system. 
 
The complexity of the system is managed by control over the formalisation process, in              
particular, as above, the representation of clinician decision-making as an MDP. One of the              
advantages of this is that the system can more easily be explained. But, as we have seen                 
this is not the best picture of how clinicians actually make decisions about the treatment of                
sepsis. 
 
The delegation of decision function is also restricted to the degree that the human in charge                
is the final, authoritative decision-maker. But, as we have seen, this intended restriction may              
be ignored in practice because of human over-reliance on or misuse of the advisory              
systems. 
 
Thus, as with the first case study, reducing the semantic gap is currently achieved by               
restricting the intended functionality. But this may inhibit the benefits that the systems can              
bring to reducing mortality due to sepsis. Sections 4 and 5 of this paper look at other                 
measures to address this gap. 
4. THE RESPONSIBILITY GAP  
4.1. Identifying the Responsibility Gap 
 
Moral responsibility is integral to practical ethics. It concerns what makes a person deserve              
moral praise or blame for some outcome. A person can be morally responsible in the               
absence of legal responsibility and legal obligations, and vice versa. This section concerns             
only moral responsibility. Determining who we can justifiably hold morally responsible for            
harm and injury due to system behaviour will likely be a precondition of public trust in                
autonomous systems.  
 
The three root causes of the semantic gap also underlie the responsibility gap. Because of               
the complexity and unpredictability of the operational domain, there is increased risk that the              
system could cause injury; it is also more likely that the system will encounter what would be                 
an ‘ethical dilemma’ for a human carrying out the same function. Because of the transfer of                
decision function to the system, its behaviour is no longer under the direct control of               
manufacturers, operators, or users. And due to the system’s complexity, its decisional            
process is largely unexplainable, even by experts. It is generally agreed that people do not               
truly deserve blame for actions they have no control over, or about which they are ignorant.                
 
 
As such, though manufacturers, operators, and users are causally involved in the process,             
this is not sufficient for robust, retrospective moral accountability for many of an autonomous              
system’s actions. The responsibility gap occurs across all phases; this paper analyses the             
specific responsibility gap that arises from behaviour due to the system’s design (i.e. from              
the semantic gap). We propose a procedure - the reflective equilibrium - inspired by political               
and moral theory -- that can be used in the design phase to address this specific                
responsibility gap. 
 
With traditional complex engineering systems, responsibility gaps may arise, but most of the             
time, the conditions are in place to hold either the manufacturers, the operators or the users                
morally responsible for accidents and injuries consequent on their design, engineering, or            
use. This is because there is no handover of the decision-making function, and system              
behaviour more directly represents human intentions; moreover, internal processes causing          
the behaviour are, for the most part, intelligible models. But with autonomous systems, moral              
responsibility for harm-causing behaviour may not be ascribable even in principle to the             
manufacturer, the operator or the user.  
 
The responsibility gap was first characterised by Andreas Matthias as follows: ​“... there is an               
increasing class of machine actions, where the traditional ways of responsibility ascriptions            
are not compatible with our sense of justice and the moral framework of society because no                
one has enough control over the machine’s actions to be able to assume responsibility for               
them.” ​[42].  
 
There is a growing body of literature on responsibility gaps [42][27][12][46][55][29]. Because            
of the severity of risk and the importance of accountability in the military domain, the notion                
is often discussed with respect to autonomous weapons and meaningful human control [65]             
[61][51]. But responsibility gaps are not exclusive to autonomous weapons. 
 
Our treatment highlights two dimensions to the responsibility gap: the Control condition and             
the Epistemic condition. This is how the gap is starting to be characterised in the               
philosophical literature [29]​. ​The Control and Epistemic conditions are sometimes called the            
‘Aristotelian conditions’: they can be traced back to Aristotle’s treatment of moral            
responsibility [3][21][12]​. ​These can be considered as necessary conditions: moral          
responsibility only obtains if the two conditions are met: 
 
● Control condition​: the person must have relevant control over the action, such that             
the action adequately represents or reflects the person’s intentions or desires 
● Epistemic condition​: the person must have had relevant knowledge and          
understanding of the action, and its likely consequences 
 
There is substantial philosophical debate about the precise content of these two conditions,             
but the present discussion can take place at a higher level of generality. To note, the                
Epistemic condition does not excuse negligent ignorance. 
 
4.2 ​Challenges to the Conditions: How the Case Studies Illustrate the Responsibility            
Gap  
 
 
In the ​first ​case study, we have a highly automated driving system. Here, the Control               
condition is weakened in general because it may not be possible for a human to take over                 
control of the system, and because the system’s actions may not reflect intentions on it. The                
Epistemic condition is weakened in general because the system’s inherent opacity due to its              
machine learning algorithms mean that its decisions are often inscrutable to manufacturers            
post hoc​.  
 
In this paper, we focus on the specific threat to moral responsibility arising from the process                
of design specification. As such, the responsible party considered here is the manufacturer,             
where this term has the wide scope highlighted in Section 1. The Control condition would               
require that behaviour resulting from the driving system’s specified functionality represents           
the manufacturer’s intentions. But it is difficult to achieve this when it is not possible to                
provide an adequate, explicit formalisation of those intentions. The Epistemic condition           
would require that the manufacturer has relevant understanding of driving behaviour that            
should result from the system’s specified functionality. But not only is it hard to foresee how                
an inherently complex, decision-making system will behave in the unpredictable operating           
environment, there is also ethical and legal uncertainty about what the system should do in               
boundary cases, where typically the human decision-maker would exercise some individual           
moral judgement. 
 
Some of the ethical concerns fielded in respect of highly autonomous vehicles are an indirect               
result of the difficulties raised by the semantic gap [6]. ​The Trolley Problem is often cited in                  
this respect - somewhat misleadingly in the authors’ opinion. The Trolley Problem puts             
forward the following dilemma: a faulty trolley is headed towards five people who will be               
killed by the collision, but the driver could steer the trolley onto another track where there is                 
only one person, a workman [22][66]. In recent years, this thought experiment has been              
applied to autonomous cars: if the runaway trolley were in fact a highly automated driving               
system, what should it do? [6][21][41][46].  
 
The Trolley Problem is an unhelpful analogy from a design perspective. In practice, it is not                
something that would be specified as part of the intended function at all. It would be avoided                 
through technical requirements such as predictive and conservative driving. The vehicles are            
being designed to avoid accidents when they can and, where this is not possible, to adopt                
other strategies, such as the minimisation of kinetic energy on impact. Indeed, their             
particular sensing abilities mean they would be able to use the braking system in better time                
than human drivers to minimise the risk of accident [43]. This conclusion is reflected in the                
German Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure Ethics Commission rules [18] on dilemma            
situations: they should be avoided by design, and the public should be made aware of               
behavioural traits and performance limits of highly automated driving vehicles on the road. 
 
The Trolley Problem is also problematic from a philosophical perspective. The thought            
experiment is intended to apply to an ideal, all-things-equal scenario, abstracted from all             
other contextual factors. But the design challenge is precisely that highly automated driving             
systems are not being designed for all-things-equal operational environments [54]. They are            
being designed for a dynamically changing environment, in which small situational changes            
are relevant to critical decisions. Thus the design problem and the Trolley Problem are              
 
 
disanalogous. And because of the complexity and unpredictability of the operational           
environment, it is not epistemically possible for manufacturers to imagine in advance all the              
combinations of factors and fine distinctions that might affect the permissibility of the action.  
 
But while the Trolley Problem does not express a realistic uncertainty for manufacturers,             
there are other examples in which ethical judgements would be made by human drivers, and               
it is unclear how this should be formally specified in the system. An often discussed dilemma                
is maintaining the flow of traffic even when this is in violation of a traffic law, such as                  
crossing a solid line in the middle of the road to avoid an obstacle in the lane. In some                   
cases, keeping to a fixed set of rules would not be the anticipated behaviour of other drivers;                 
it could lead to a risk of a rear-end collision.  
 
In the ​second case study, we have a clinical advisory system. Because the final decision               
here is implemented by a human, there is only a partial transfer of decision function, and                
more human control, though as we have seen humans may over-rely on the system over               
time. The responsibility gap that is incurred by such systems is narrower, but it does still                
arise. There are general epistemic problems in explaining the decisional process of the             
inherently complex system. And there are more particular challenges to the two conditions,             
some of which arise specifically during the design phase. As above, in terms of the Control                
condition, it is difficult to make sure the system’s recommendations represent intended            
functionality when it is not possible fully to formalise intention. In terms of the Epistemic               
condition, it is hard to know or understand what the intended functionality should be. In the                
case of AI Clinician, this is because what constitutes best practice depends on the              
interactions between clinicians and nurses, and the fact that best practice changes, both in              
terms of an evolving understanding of optimal behaviour (e.g., a gradual move away from              
fluids towards vasopressors) and in terms of environmental changes (e.g., new diseases and             
treatments) that serve to change what is “optimal”.  
 
4.3 The Method of Reflective Equilibrium: A Suggestion for Reducing the           
Responsibility gap 
A partial solution to the problem of the responsibility gap incurred during system design can               
be drawn from the method of the “reflective equilibrium,” as articulated primarily by the              
philosopher John Rawls [15][59][58] ​. While others have posited this method as an approach             
to designing the internal reasoning capacity of ethical advisory systems [73], our contribution             
is to propose an adaptation of this method to navigate some of the problems arising from the                 
semantic gap - in particular, so that manufacturers have more responsibility-grounding           
control with respect to harm due to the system’s design.  
 
The method of reflective equilibrium is particularly helpful to decide the best course of action               
where there is uncertainty [18]. It is an inductive reasoning process that involves agents              
making specific, context-sensitive judgements (e.g. judgements about the system’s desired          
functionality), on the one hand, and evaluating these against a wider set of moral principles               
and non-moral beliefs, on the other, and revising each until there is an acceptable coherence               
among them [15]. We suggest that the process can offer greater clarity on intended              
functionality, including where ‘ethical dilemmas’ are concerned. This can enable a more            
complete system specification. 
 
 
 
Here is a sketch of how it might work in the ​first ​case study. Competent moral judges, with                  
sufficient technical understanding as well as experience of urban driving environments, and            
who would not gain personally from any particular specification agreed, could work in             
multi-disciplinary design teams and make considered judgements about ethical system          
behaviour in actual and hypothetical “boundary” scenarios (e.g., exceeding the speed limit to             
avoid an obstacle). Boundary scenarios are important because it is typically on the             
boundaries of expectations that hazards arise. Those judgements could be considered           
against their own and others’ different moral and non-moral beliefs (e.g. beliefs about the              
practical consequences of excessively cautious driving and beliefs about what is technically            
or computationally feasible). The process involves achieving equilibrium between the          
judgements of various people involved in the development of the systems; legal experts             
could also be included here. 
 
The hypothetical boundary scenarios that warrant special attention can be identified during            
simulation of the system in the design phase. Integral to this approach is the automatic               
detection or generation of such scenarios based on a definition of risk, such as a high                
likelihood of harm no matter what the system’s action. During simulation, these scenarios             
can be replayed with various parameters, to explore the expected boundaries of the system              
behaviour. Indeed, the process can lead to a set of reference situations that better determine               
the expected range of system behaviour in critical scenarios. Because judgements are            
evaluated against technical feasibility at the start of the process, far-fetched dilemmas such             
as the Trolley Problem would be ruled out early on, but more realistic dilemmas would be                
incorporated. Where certain judgements are deemed unacceptable, because they are          
incompatible with other deeply held beliefs and principles, revisions to the initial judgements             
can be made. At times, revisions to the principles may be made instead. These revisions               
may include, for example, limiting the intended functionality or accepting a higher risk or              
uncertainty.  
 
Applied to the ​second case study, the method of reflective equilibrium might work as              
follows. Competent moral judges, again with sufficient technical understanding as well as            
clinical knowledge of sepsis and ICU settings, can work in multi-disciplinary teams to identify              
the most salient open questions (e.g. patient history) and features of the domain (e.g. the               
different aetiologies of sepsis). They can evaluate these judgements against different moral            
and non-moral beliefs (e.g. beliefs about best practice and beliefs about technical feasibility).             
The method can also be used to gauge foreseeable misuse - such as busy clinicians               
over-relying on the system, or being dis-incentivised to override the system’s           
recommendations. Moreover, the decision procedure may help to establish principled          
positions on when such uses would be unacceptable given the clinician’s retained            
responsibility for patient safety. Overall, reflective equilibrium offers a methodology by which            
to navigate the complexities of the domain and the expectations on the system.  
 
Because the method of reflective equilibrium enables manufacturers to have more rational            
control and understanding during the design phase, thereby addressing the Control and            
Epistemic dimensions of the responsibility gap in this phase, it helps to secure more robust               
moral accountability for behaviour arising from the system’s specified functionality. It also            
 
 
facilitates consensus on ‘acceptable safety’ for different autonomous systems, which can           
ground a stronger justification for the specified functionality of the systems. But some caution              
is also required. First, the reflective equilibrium may help to narrow the responsibility gap              
arising from the semantic gap, but as it has been discussed here, it does not address the                 
further problem of moral responsibility for outcomes that are traceable to events and             
interventions post-design [11]. The second note of caution is pragmatic: the procedure would             
need to be robustly managed, with workable limits, to ensure that real progress is made in                
the timeframes appropriate for the rate of change of systems. Third, it would ideally be               
overseen by regulatory bodies for autonomous systems - and this is likely to be a significant                
change for the majority of regulators. 
5. THE LIABILITY GAP  
5.1 Identifying the Liability Gap 
  
There is a liability gap for harms caused by autonomous systems. This gap partly emerges               
from the replacement of human actors in general; it also results from this combined with the                
inherent complexity of the system and the complexity of the operational domain. This             
combination may lead to the loss falling on the victim of the harm. As well as describing the                  
liability gap, and illustrating it with the two case studies, this section attempts to solve this                
gap, and introduces the concept of “tech neutrality” in the law of tort.  
  
5.1.1 Tort Law 
There are a number of legal systems in the World, here we examine the English common                
law as a case study. This legal family is found throughout the English speaking world, for                
instance in the United States, Singapore, and Australia. Within this legal family [74], liability              
law has the same structure and language [70]. The problems, and liability gap, encountered              
in England and Wales in relation to liability for harms caused by autonomous systems are               
typical of all common law jurisdictions. 
  
Harm resulting to another from the use of a product or system is typically resolved through                
the law of tort. Tort law is concerned with civil liability for wrongs, and typically redresses the                 
harm through financial compensation, (called damages), or less often injunctions to prevent            
continuing harm. We need to distinguish tort from crime. Most harms inflicted by             
autonomous systems will not be crimes if they had instead been committed by a person. For                
instance not all who cause the deaths of others are criminalised, even if they are at fault.                 
The standard of fault required for criminalisation is much higher than the standard of fault               
required to be civilly liable to pay compensatory damages to the victim. Crime is also rarely                
concerned with unintentional wrongs that result in non-fatal harm. Thus this paper only             
considers civil law. 
  
Tort law, whilst it also has a regulatory function, is not the same as government regulation.                
Claims are brought against the wrongdoer by the parties who are injured, and not by the                
state. Even if a regulatory body has approved a product, it does not mean that there is no                  
liability in tort if harm results from its use [68]. Tort looks at redressing harms, whilst also                 
having regulatory force [38]. 
 
 
  
Sometimes the development of novel products can outpace the capacity of legislative and             
administrative bodies to produce new regulatory codes for such products, or alternatively            
they may decide such codes are inappropriate, and leave regulation solely to the ordinary              
law of tort [49]. Ordinarily tort, not regulation, provides redress for harm. Thus to oust tort is                 
to oust compensation for harm. The broadest, and most commonly applied tort is the tort of                
negligence. 
  
5.1.2 Harms Caused by Persons 
Before the liability gap in tort generated by the adoption of autonomous systems in place of                
human workers becomes apparent, we need to briefly deal with the situation of where a               
person causes actionable harm to another. Not all harms are actionable, but here we are               
concerned with personal injury, which is. 
  
If A negligently injures B, A has committed the tort of negligence and is liable to compensate                 
B for his loss. C may also be liable to compensate B for A’s tort via a form of strict liability                     
called “vicarious liability”, provided firstly, there is a relationship between A and C sufficient              
to trigger the doctrine; and secondly, A’s tort must be sufficiently connected with that              
relationship to render C vicariously liable for the tort [48]. Vicarious liability typically occurs in               
the context of employment, making an employer vicariously liable for the torts of its              
employees, provided the employee’s tort was closely connected with their employment.           
However, it also applies to a range of other relationships, particularly where C has control               
over A - that is the ability to tell A what to do, and perhaps also how to do it, and A’s work is                        
integrated into C’s organisation [49]. A broad approach is taken to close connection [5]. It               
goes without saying that a crash with another vehicle caused by the poor driving of an                
employee required to drive as part of their employment would result in vicarious liability for               
the employee’s negligent driving, as would the death of a patient resulting from the poor               
treatment of sepsis by a medical practitioner. In such cases both A and C are liable to the                  
victim B (or their estate) for A’s negligence. 
  
Where a person, A, commits a tort against B; C may also be liable to B for C’s own                   
negligence where C’s own negligence results in A committing a tort against B. This is               
separate from vicarious liability, and it for instance applies where C owed B a duty of care to                  
properly select, train, and monitor A, and where C fails to meet the standard expected in                
doing so, and this failure resulted in A committing the tort against B [5]. B’s claim against C                  
is called a direct duty claim. This direct duty claim is based on C’s own negligence.                
However, the vicarious liability claim against C is easier to sustain in that unlike the direct                
duty claim you do not need to prove that C owed B a duty of care, nor do you need to prove                      
C’s fault. Now that we have an overview of the liability systems in place for individuals, the                 
liability gap created by the use of autonomous systems may now be identified. 
  
5.1.3 The Liability Gap 
The liability gap results from the replacement of employees with autonomous systems. This             
gap occurs since whilst the system can harm another in ways similar to an employee, unlike                
an employee it cannot commit a tort. This is since systems or products are not legal persons,                 
meaning that they are not subject to rights or duties in law.  
 
 
  
That autonomous systems are not persons results in a liability gap, when compared to the               
scenario of A, B, and C above. Where the user (C) uses an autonomous system (Φ) in place                  
of A, and Φ causes harm to B, B of course cannot sue Φ (since Φ is not a legal person),                     
however, it also means that B cannot sue C vicariously, since vicarious liability requires a               
tort, and since Φ is not a legal person it cannot commit a tort. This is the case even if the                     
action of Φ would be a tort if it were committed by a person.  
  
It may be possible to construct, by analogy to the employment situation, a duty of care owed                 
by C to B to take reasonable care to select a suitable system (Φ), and to take reasonable                  
care to maintain, update, and monitor its operation. However, given the need for C’s fault for                
this claim to succeed this direct duty claim will not provide for liability in all cases where                 
vicarious liability would apply if Φ were replaced with a human (A). Indeed given the               
complexity of autonomous systems, and the often black box situation associated with its AI              
components, the user of Φ is rarely likely to be at fault provided they follow the                
manufacturer’s guidance. 
  
The existence of the semantic gap will also mean that unexpected harm may result from the                
use of the system. Further, the employing enterprise will only be directly (as opposed to               
vicariously) liable where the type of harm that results from the enterprise’s own negligence is               
foreseeable. 
  
For the user C, using Φ in place of A reduces their exposure to liability, at B’s (the victim’s)                   
cost. However, the liability gap of the enterprise that uses the technology in place of               
employees, may be partly offset by the fact that there can additionally be liability on the part                 
of the manufacturers of Φ. Although, as we will see below there are significant limits to this                 
liability, and it does not fully account for the liability gap created by the absence of vicarious                 
liability. 
  
5.1.4 Claims Against Manufacturers do not Close this Gap 
Unlike where A is human, with Φ, there are potential claims against Φ’s manufacturer. The               
first claim is under the UK’s Consumer Protection Act 1987, which implements an EU              
directive [13]. The Act introduces liability without fault in certain circumstances, which is             
caused by a defective product. Section 2(1) states: “…where any damage is caused wholly              
or partly by a defect in a product, every person to whom subsection (2) below applies [i.e.                 
the manufacturer and others] shall be liable for the damage.” 
 
It’s important to note that there is no need for fault here. The claimant relying on the Act                  
does not need to prove that the defendant was negligent. The Act refers to products [13] and                 
this is unlikely to include software unless it is supplied in a physical medium [39]. This is                 
problematic in claims involving machine learning if their software is subsequently updated            
over the internet, and for cloud based products. 
 
Even though the claimant does not need to prove fault, they need to prove that the product is                  
defective. The product is deemed defective “if the safety of the product is not such as                
persons generally are entitled to expect...” [39]. Where a product meets the safety             
 
 
standards imposed by the relevant regulatory regimes, it is difficult to argue that the product               
is defective [39]. 
  
Where a product is not only inherently dangerous but known to everyone to be so, (such as                 
hot coffee), its danger has to be factored into the public’s reasonable expectation for the               
purpose of defectiveness. This will also be the case with autonomous systems. 
  
Key for claims against a manufacturer when dealing with the semantic gap, and machine              
learning, is a defence [39] the defendant is not liable if the defect comes into existence after                 
he parts with the product. Thus if the defective behaviour comes into existence after the               
manufacturer parts with the product (unless it is the learning design itself that is defective)               
then it is likely that the manufacturer will not be liable. Where we are dealing with machine                 
learning proving that the system was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer will                
be extremely difficult [14]. This is problematic in the context of the semantic gap in that with                 
autonomous systems, such as in the case of highly automated driving, the operational             
design domain (operational environment) should be expected to reasonably change over           
time after the release of the product (for instance the change of behaviour or appearance of                
other traffic participants), and thus defects may only come to light at a much later stage. 
  
There is also a defence which is included in the statute to encourage technological              
innovation, which will also protect the manufacturer. It is a defence to prove: “that the state                
of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant time was not such that a producer of                
products of the same description as the product in question might be expected to have               
discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control” [14].                 
Whilst this defence has been narrowly applied [7], these features of the Consumer             
Protection Act 1987 mean that claims for injuries resulting from subsequently adapted            
behaviour may be difficult to sustain. Legally it means that technologies can be deployed              
even where they are not fully understood. 
  
In addition there is a possible claim against the manufacturer in the tort of negligence where                
a person suffers actionable harm caused by the manufacturer [71]. Negligence is not strict              
liability. The injured claimant needs to prove fault on the part of the manufacturer. The               
manufacturer only owes a duty to the claimant take such care as is reasonable in the                
circumstances. 
  
This duty is only to do what is reasonable in the circumstances, not to guard against every                 
risk. If a product complies with minimum standards set by government or other relevant              
organisations, that is generally evidence that the manufacturer has not been negligent. With             
autonomous systems such standards have not yet been forthcoming, leading to an unclear             
understanding of what it is reasonable to expect. 
  
Such a claim in negligence will be both difficult and costly. If the system was manufactured                
in accordance with its design, then the claimant has to prove that the design itself is                
defective. The claimant also needs to prove that the risk ought to have been foreseen at the                 
time the product left the defendant’s control. For instance by demonstrating that the testing              
 
 
of the product was inadequate [39]. In the context of the inevitable semantic gap when               
dealing with autonomous systems, such a claim will be difficult to sustain.  
  
Further a manufacturer may be justified in taking known or foreseeable risks. If there is a                
genuine demand for a product, the product is as safe as it can be made at reasonable cost,                  
and the danger posed by the product is not significantly out of proportion to its social                
benefits, an action in negligence against the manufacturer will fail [34]. Given the significant              
social benefits of autonomous systems it is likely that the law of negligence will tolerate the                
semantic gap. 
  
Particularly problematic for a claim in negligence in relation to learned characteristics is the              
fact that there will be no manufacturer liability in negligence if the product was not dangerous                
at the time when the manufacturer parted with it, and he had no reason to anticipate that it                  
would become dangerous. Further the complexity and unpredictability of operating domain,           
makes negligence hard to prove. However, where a product proves particularly dangerous            
after it has left the defendant’s control, there may be a duty to recall it. 
  
The need to prove fault means that negligence claims against manufacturers for learned             
characteristics will be difficult to prove. 
 
5.2 How the Case Studies Illustrate this Gap 
The potential for manufacturer liability does not offset the loss of the vicarious liability claim.               
A significant liability gap has emerged where an autonomous systems replaces an            
employee, to which the semantic gap contributes.  
  
A human driver may commit the tort of negligence, a highly automated driving vehicle may               
not. In the case of such vehicles the UK Parliament has recognised the need to provide for                 
victims, and has passed the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018. This Act attempts to               
solve the liability gap for such vehicles by introducing statutory liability of the vehicle’s              
insurer. This is an ​ad hoc solution to the liability gap and it does not apply outside of this                   
context to other autonomous systems. It also operates in a context where as with other               
motor vehicles insurance is compulsory – this is one of the very few areas where English law                 
mandates insurance coverage. This statutory solution hides the broader liability gap problem            
which results from autonomous systems replacing employees, but at least it provides victims             
with a route of claim where they are injured by such vehicles. Other delivery systems, and                
other applications of autonomous technologies are not dealt with by the Act and the liability               
gap remains in these cases. 
  
With the clinical technology case study the system is advisory. A human actor is still present.                
This means that where the medical practitioner is negligent in conducting the treatment, no              
liability gap is present since a claim may be brought against the medical practitioner or their                
employer. However, where it is reasonable to rely on the system, the practitioner will not be                
negligent, even if the actual decision of the system, or the advice it provides, if it had been                  
generated by a doctor would be negligent. In such a scenario a liability gap is present. But                 
since this gap is only present when the human involved in the medical treatment is not at                 
 
 
fault, this liability gap is smaller than if the system operated autonomously. However, it is               
still present. 
  
The case studies show that the liability gap is greatest for more highly autonomous systems.               
This is since with an assistive system an individual may in some circumstances still be at                
fault in implementing the system’s recommendations. The key message is any autonomous            
system, particularly those using machine learning models, will lead to a liability gap when              
compared to that role being carried out by an employee, unless it is specifically addressed               
through statutory means. The semantic gap means that this liability gap will not be bridged               
by the ability to bring claims against manufacturers. 
  
5.3 Suggestions and Methods for Reducing this Gap 
The failure to treat autonomous systems as persons for tort purposes limits the liability of               
users, when compared to those who use employees to do the same work. This creates a tort                 
incentive to replace employees with autonomous systems even where to do so represents a              
greater risk to third parties. It also encourages a reduction in safety measures. 
  
Tort law deters, particularly at the organisational level [17]. Properly deployed it deters             
harmful conduct, and encourages safer methods [38] ​. Where tort encourages the adoption            
of less safe behaviour this is a perversion of its deterrent role. Tort must be “Tech Neutral”;                 
that is, it should neither encourage nor discourage the adoption of new technologies, where              
the risks of harm that such technologies pose to third parties are the same when compared                
to older technologies and methods. Tort should only encourage or discourage adoption            
where systems are more, or less safe, than the alternatives. With the liability gap tort               
encourages the adoption of autonomous systems even in situations where they are less safe              
than their alternatives. 
  
To solve this problem, this article does not advocate that systems should be granted full               
legal-personhood [10] [64] [69] as this will come with a host of other problems, such as its                 
being able to own property, sue (as well as being sued), and have its own legal rights. In                  
order to attempt to close the liability gap this article suggests a statutory form of vicarious                
liability for autonomous systems, and that the system should be treated as ​if it were a person                 
only for the purpose of imposing liability on its user or ‘principal’. Autonomous systems can               
act as agents and form contracts on behalf of their principals [56] ​. It is not outlandish to                 
suggest that they should be deemed to also be able to act as a form of ‘agent’ for the                   
purposes of attributing liability to a principal in tort law.  
 
To instead attempt to solve the liability gap merely by strengthening a victim’s claims against 
the manufacturer, means that tort law will not be tech neutral vis-à-vis the system user. 
Statutory vicarious liability by mimicking the system of liability in place for employees 
ensures that tort law is tech neutral, and does not encourage or discourage an employer 
from adopting new technologies to replace employees where their risks of harm are the 
same. It prevents users of technology escaping liability for their negative externalities by 
replacing humans with machines.  It also helps to close the consequences of the semantic 
gap.  However, care should be taken not to introduce new avenues of claim that would not 
 
 
be present for other technologies or persons. To do so might discourage the adoption of 
technology, even where it represents a reduced risk for society. 
 
6. A WAY FORWARD: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY “GAPS” ANALYSIS TO         
INFORM SAFETY ASSURANCE 
This paper has discussed the relationship between the semantic, responsibility and liability            
gaps in autonomous systems. We have illustrated these gaps using examples from the             
highly automated driving and clinical advisory domains. These gaps are currently hindering            
the development and adoption of technologies that have the potential for huge societal             
benefits. A summary of the semantic, responsibility and liability gaps is given in Table 1. 
 
  Semantic gap  Responsibility gap Liability Gap 
Description 
 
 
Normal conditions for 
complete specification are 
not present 
Normal conditions for moral 
responsibility are not 
present 
Normal conditions for civil 
liability are not present 
Root causes Complexity and 
unpredictability of the 
operating environment 
 
Complexity and 
unpredictability of the 
operating environment 
 
Complexity and 
unpredictability of the 
operating environment 
 
Complexity and 
unpredictability of the 
system 
  
Complexity and 
unpredictability of the 
system 
  
Complexity and 
unpredictability of the 
system 
  
Transfer of decision function 
to the system 
Transfer of decision function 
to the system 
Transfer of decision function 
to the system 
When incurred Design phase All phases All phases 
Responsible 
parties 
Manufacturer Manufacturer, operator, and 
user  
Manufacturer, operator, and 
user  
Risk Acceptable safety is 
under-specified 
No one is morally 
accountable for harm 
Loss falls on the victim 
Table 1: Summary of the Semantic, Responsibility and Liability Gaps 
 
4.1 The Way Forward: Immediate Steps  
 
An analysis of the gaps across design, ethics, and law can contribute to ethically- and               
legally-informed engineering processes, and engineering-informed ethics and legal practice.         
In turn, this offers a promising approach for grounding the justification of safety requirements              
for autonomous systems.  
 
The integration of these multi-disciplinary perspectives could be achieved by addressing the            
following three “touch points” between the disciplines, and this can be done based on current               
 
 
understanding of the technical, ethical and legal issues, and the descriptions of the gaps we               
introduced above.  
 
Definition of the operational domain​: A better understanding of the ethical and legal             
expectations on the system for a given operational domain, including tolerable residual risk,             
known laws and precedents, and different cultural attitudes, contributes to a more holistic             
definition, which enables a more complete specification of the system. A good definition of              
the operational domain can give a sound basis for reducing the semantic gap, and for               
contributing towards the understanding and managing of responsibility and liability gaps.           
Hereby, a deep understanding of the technical limitations of the situation shall be used to               
evaluate the actual risk caused by the system for any given context. 
 
Detailed system design and evaluation​: Safety-critical scenarios should be identified          
during the system design phase. We have suggested the method of reflective equilibrium to              
determine technically feasible, ethically justified system behaviour in different types of           
scenarios. A legal representative can also be included in this reflective process in the design               
phase. Simulation techniques and field validation data in particular would allow for variations             
of scenarios to be generated and evaluated in order better to define the acceptable              
boundaries of the system behaviour. If an acceptable response cannot be achieved, then a              
restriction of the operational design domain or an alternative system design may be required. 
 
Post-hoc analysis and allocation of blame and liability ​: In liability cases, an equally             
balanced cross-disciplinary process could be applied to analyse the specific incident in            
detail, based on the available information and multiple perspectives included in the initial             
reflective design process.  
 
The idea is not that these multi-disciplinary touch points are applied sequentially across the              
development process, but rather that the interactions occur continually to ensure that the             
semantic gap is iteratively minimised. Future work should develop the suggestions detailed            
above and apply them to real-world case studies in order to derive a set of concrete                
recommendations for future development, standardisation and regulation. 
 
4.2 The Way Forward: Emerging Approaches 
There are some additional novel, or emerging, approaches which we believe would help to              
address these issues – to reduce the gaps. What is proposed here is largely aspirational –                
although there is ongoing work developing these approaches:  
 
1. Safety Case – a key part of the safety case should define how gaps are identified                
and what has been done to control them. For example, the argument should include              
a demonstration of the delimitation of moral and legal responsibility between           
designer/manufacturer, operator and the user. Figure 3 outlines the safety assurance           
dimensions relevant to the semantic gap. Similar models are needed for the other             
gaps, and for the detailed problems of the use AI and machine learning in the               
system; see [4] for ideas on these issues. Acceptance of the safety case should be               
based on the method of reflective equilibrium, achieving an acceptable level of            
 
 
coherence amongst the considered judgements and beliefs of representatives from          
as many relevant stakeholder groups as possible. 
2. Monitoring and Dynamic Assurance – due to the complexity and uncertainty of the             
system and its operational environment, it is likely that the initial safety case will not               
accurately reflect the actual gaps – be they semantic, responsibility or legal. The             
systems of interest are data-rich, and this gives the opportunity to assess what is              
actually happening, as opposed to what was anticipated at the design stage. We can              
use machine learning to process the operational data, to determine whether or not             
the initial safety case was accurate, and to identify the need for remedial action if not                
[44], with some initial validation of the ideas in the healthcare domain (treatment of              
atrial fibrillation following thoracic surgery). This work may ultimately enable the           
safety case to be updated dynamically to reflect actual risks and gaps, although this              
is most likely to be practicable for the semantic gap. 
3. Soft Law ​– legal and regulatory processes change slowly, and it is difficult to keep               
pace with technological change. Whilst some changes in the ‘hard law’ might be             
desirable or essential, e.g. to produce ‘tech neutral’ tort law, other changes which we              
refer to as ‘soft law’ might help mitigate some of the legal gaps. An example might be                 
an industry-wide code of practice, which companies adopt. The code of practice            
could also include provisions on the compensation of those harmed by autonomous            
systems, which would help to address part of the liability gap arising from the              
semantic gap. If companies do not comply with the code, then this could lead to               
qualification of annual reports when the company is audited. Soft law may also help              
to shape the standards expected by the courts of actors in the industry, for instance               
when courts determine claims in negligence. Another advantage of soft law is that it              
may be capable of influence across different jurisdictions. Further, standards bodies           
are aware of the need to be more agile, and some are producing Publicly Available               
Specifications (PAS) or other pre-normative standards as this can done rapidly; the            
IEEE P7000 series, are a good example of this.  
4. Regulation and Governance – the characteristics of AI and autonomous systems,           
especially where used in critical situations, challenge traditional approaches to          
regulation and governance; it will be hard for regulatory frameworks to keep up with              
the pace of change, and governance will also need to be increasingly agile. Whilst              
‘soft law’ approaches might help here, there are real challenges in regulating and             
governing such technologies. Points that need to be considered include; explicit           
balancing of benefits against risk; the notion of ‘contestability’ of decisions (this may             
be more practicable than explainability), and accountability. There have been many           
publications on principles for ‘ethical AI’, including [67]; whilst there are some            
similarities in the published principles, many are expressed rather more as ‘values’,            
e.g. harmony, than principles that can be realised. There remains a significant issue             
in implementing regulatory and governance principles, given the pace of change and            
the geographic spread of the technologies, the scope of supply chains, etc.            
Encouragingly, in the UK the government is funding work on making regulation more             
adaptive, including supporting “regulatory sandpits”, which are analogous with “safe          
harbours”, that enable experimentation with agile regulatory principles. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Safety Assurance Dimensions 
 
4.3 Closing Remarks 
In the London underground and in other transportation systems travellers are exhorted to             
‘mind the gap’ when boarding or alighting from trains, where the gap between the train and                
the platform is seen as a source of risk. It seems to us that this might also be a useful                    
exhortation for those developing, deploying, and regulating AI and autonomous systems.           
Our hope is that by finding systematic ways of identifying and categorising ‘gaps’ we can               
assist in exposing the sources of risk with AI and autonomous systems, and thus contribute               
to risk control. This paper has shown that the notion can be used in technical, ethical and                 
legal contexts and we believe that it might be a unifying concept, and one that can also be                  
applied in more detailed models of assurance [44] ​.  
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